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TO ALL LATIN AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC POSTS

Serious developments in Cuba and US position embodied in President's letter to Khrushchev and his address to US editors necessitate earliest consultation with Latin American Governments to promote understanding of (1) what occurred in Cuba; (2) disclosures which these developments made about the security of Western hemisphere; (3) implications for the OAS; (4) lines of action US is contemplating.

Following is suggested basis for such consultation which has not yet been approved but is forwarded only for your comment and suggestion as quickly as possible.

Recent Developments

1. A volunteer force of some 1,200 Cuban freedom fighters landed on south coast of Cuba in early morning April 17 for declared purpose liberating their country from communist dictatorship Fidel Castro. They were all Cubans under Cuban commander. They had received support from American sources, both official and private, as

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well as support elsewhere in classical manner such refugee efforts. They had been training for months and demanding opportunity to strike their blow for freedom. The timing of their effort was due to their determination, the prospect of heavy military build-up by Castro with Communist support and onset of rainy season. Achievement of primary objective--overthrow of Castro regime--depended on substantial internal uprisings against Castro to be stimulated by their admittedly limited military effort. It was recognized that, failing prompt support of substantial elements of Cubans in Cuba, group would necessarily pass to guerrilla activity. Actual operation badly mauled by heavier Castro air and tank capability than expected. Similarly, totalitarian control apparatus was far more effective than predicted. After gallant effort beachhead was overrun on afternoon April 19. Some freedom fighters are believed to have joined guerrillas, some withdrew, some escaped beachhead in boats, but casualties severe. The intimidation and massive roundup

in concentration areas of persons known to be unsympathetic to Castro regime, coupled with failure of expedition^{new} force to strike through Castro's defense and make contact with population severely limited possibilities of spontaneous uprising.

Decision was made not to intervene with US armed forces. Had combination of landing group, active guerrillas, more defectors, and resistant population made it possible to establish viable position in Cuba question might have arisen with regard to recognition and support. Lacking this situation, US unwilling consider Hungarian type operation in Cuba.

2. Lessons of Cuban Developments (See "lessons" cited in President's April 20 address.) Immediate and complete Sino-Soviet and Communist Party support, Khrushchev's public message to President, degree of imposition totalitarian methods, and disclosure extent of arms supplied Castro made it clear that Communists consider Cuba an important potential center of power within Western hemisphere and have made a significant commitment to maintenance their position.

3. Implications for OAS Three lines of action are possible:

a. Multilateral - The American Republics have created a collective organization--the OAS--to deal among other aspects with danger of domination of Western Hemisphere by external power. OAS is specifically committed to take steps to prevent Communist domination of Western Hemisphere. In the Cuban case, Communist domination exists and included in this is domination by Sino-Soviet bloc, which is also providing heavy armament and organization clearly directed against other American States. Above all US desires achieve security indictment of Cuba through multilateral procedures in OAS.

b. Group - If OAS fails to take multilateral action, it will be the need and responsibility of those nations that understand and oppose communism and extra-continental aggression or domination to assist each other in struggle.

c. Unilateral - In absence of multilateral or group action, US might have to act unilaterally on behalf of its own security and that of hemisphere.

4. Proposed courses of US action

US considering manner OAS consultative machinery might be used establish basis for action required. Minimum aim to establish beyond doubt that Castro regime, through its capture by the interventionist apparatus of world Communist movement, no longer entitled to be regarded as respected member of inter-American community. Consultative machinery should be Organ Consultation, Rio Treaty, in accordance Article 6 on grounds capture and use Castro Government by world communism gravely threatens security American States and endangers peace of Americas. (Possible alternative procedures include a meeting Foreign Ministers under OAS Charter consider problem of "urgent nature, common interest" or meeting Presidents American States (held Panama 1956).

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Specific measures OAS would seek:

1. Finding that political institutions Castro regime in Cuba under "domination and control" international Communist movement and that this extension to hemisphere of political system extra-continental power constitutes intervention and a threat to sovereignty, political independence American States, endangering peace of Americas.

2. Measures under Article 8 of Rio Treaty, short of use of armed force:

- a. breaking of diplomatic and consular relations;
- b. partial or complete interruption of economic relations;
- c. partial or complete interruption of sea, air, postal, telephone, telegraphic, and radio communications relations.

3. Other measures, short of armed force:

- a. the withdrawal of recognition of Castro regime as government of State of Cuba;
- b. operation of joint naval-aerial patrol of Caribbean area for observation purposes, designed to help prevent shipment of arms and personnel from Cuba to other countries for support of subversive activities;
- c. reactivation perhaps ~~either~~ under another name of Emergency Advisory Committee for Political Defense (established 1942 by Meeting of American Foreign Ministers at Rio de Janeiro), or establishment of similar body, for purpose of assisting governments in combatting Communist subversion within their territories.

4. Measures involving armed force to be considered for future contingency: an air and sea blockade of Cuba to prevent Soviet-bloc shipments to Cuba of arms and other assistance, and other possible measures.

5. Bilateral action Direct arrangement between US and other individual governments, particularly in Caribbean area, under which US would work intimately with and come immediately to the assistance of such governments in resisting Castro penetration, threats and attack.

6. Unilateral action If OAS, group and bilateral action indicated above do not succeed in curbing threat to hemisphere and to US national security, US would have to consider whatever steps might be required under circumstances existing at the time.